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872' WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
and the statutory language of the 1954 Code." The Fourth Circuit has
balanced fairness and finality in providing relief from a situation which
would otherwise have caused undue hardship. Chertkof clarifies the ap-
plication of the mitigation provisions and demonstrates that the Fourth
Circuit will not sacrifice fairness in a restrictive interpretation of the
statutes' goals.
ROBERT C. MOOT, JR.
XIII. TORTS
A. Commercial Buyers Ineligible for Strict Liability Relief
Prior to 1962, a plaintiff could bring a products liability action' only
under negligence and breach of warranty theories If a plaintiff could
not prove the necessary elements of negligence' or show that either an
unless statute expressly contrary); Knowles Elec., Inc. v. United States, 365 F.2d 43, 48 (7th
Cir. 1966) (purpose of mitigation provisions is to provide fair and workable formula under
which taxpayer given relief from unjust results); Gooding v. United States, 326 F.2d 988,
993 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (mitigation provisions create mechanism of relief); Olin Mathieson Chem.
Corp. v. United States, 265 F.2d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1959) (same). In Chertkof, the Fourth Cir-
cuit has adopted the position that Congress intended the mitigation provisions to be
remedial. See 676 F.2d at 990-92. The Fourth Circuit noted that in promulgating the mitiga-
tion statutes, Congress intended to be just. Id. at 991. The Chertkof court found that no
policy reasons existed for not finding in favor of the taxpayers. Id.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3 (1982) (three possible
grounds for products liability are negligence, contract, and strict liability); D. NOEL, PRO-
DUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 1-4, 13-15, 67-72 (1974) (three bases of recovery in products
liability are negligence, warranty, and strict liability); P. SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR
THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER 1-5, 41-53, 187-98 (1981) (four bases of recovery in products
liability are negligence, express warranty, implied warranty, and strict liability).
2 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962). In Greenman, the California Supreme Court first utilized strict liability theory to
award damages in a products liability suit. Id. at 59-60, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Fall]. The Greenman court allowed products
liability redress to a plaintiff who did not stand in contractual privity with the manufacturer
and who could not prove negligence. Id. at 803-04.
3 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 142-48 (4th ed. 1971). A cause of ac-
tion in negligence must allege four elements, duty, breach, proximate cause, and injury. Id.
at 143-44. Actionable negligence is conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of
causing danger. Id. at 142-43. See generally Alexander v. Seaboard Air Lines R.R. Co., 346
F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (plaintiff must show that defendant breached duty of care);
Fernandez v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 386 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (commercial sporting
arena has duty to guard against foreseeable injury to spectators); Hendeles v. Sanford Auto
Auction, Inc., 364 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1978) (plaintiff in negligence action must show that defend-
ant's tortious conduct caused injury); Pasadena State Bank v. Isaac, 149 Tex. 47, 228 S.W.2d
127 (1950) (plaintiff must show that defendant's breach caused appreciable injury); see also
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express4 or implied' warranty existed in the product, courts would not
grant relief or award damages." In 1962, the California Supreme Court
allowed redress to a plaintiff who could not prove manufacturer
negligence or breach of warranty.7 In granting relief, the California
Supreme Court was the first judicial body to state and apply a theory of
"strict liability in tort."' Other courts soon accepted the doctrine of
strict liability in tort and established strict liability as a third theory for
recovery in products liability actions.'
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REv. 40, 40-41 (1915) (complaint not alleging duty, breach,
cause, and injury will not withstand test of demurrer).
See U.C.C. § 2-313. Express warranties are formal affirmations of fact or promises
made by a seller to a buyer that become part of the basis of the bargain between a seller
and a buyer. Id. Express warranties are negotiated guarantees of product safety, reliability,
or performance. Id. See generally 1 R. STEINHEIMER, DESK REFERENCE TO THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 225-26 (1966); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-2, at 327-28 (2d ed. 1980).
' See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to 316. The law of commercial transactions implies a warranty of
merchantability into a contract for the sale of goods. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1). The law of commer-
cial transactions also implies a warranty that the goods are fit for their intended purpose
when the seller knows at the time of contracting that the buyer is relying upon the seller's
judgment to furnish suitable goods. U.C.C. § 2-315. The parties to a contract can exclude or
modify any implied warranties through negotiation and bargaining. U.C.C. § 2-316. See
generally STEINHEIMER, supra note 4, at 226-31; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 9-6, at
343-49.
' See, e.g., Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968) (ex-
tremely remote injury to ship not recoverable in tort action); L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220
Ind. 86, -, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1941) (no duty exists to rescue stranger); Cornpropst v.
Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 198 (Tenn. 1975) (intervening cause breaks chain of causation).
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962). The trial court in Greenman ruled that the plaintiffs evidence did not establish an ac-
tionable claim in negligence. Id. at 58, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. The Greenman
jury denied the plaintiff relief on his breach of warranty cause after finding that the plain-
tiff failed to give notice to the manufacturer as required by California law. Id. at 58-59, 377
P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
1Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. In Greenman, Justice Traynor argued
that strict liability in tort is appropriate when a manufacturer places a product on the
market with the knowledge that a consumer will use the product without prior inspection
for defects. Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 900,27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 Justice Traynor further determined
that the manufacturer's product must possess a defect which causes injury to the consumer.
Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. The plaintiff in Greenman suffered personal
injury and not property damage. Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 898-99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99. Justice
Traynor intended for the Greenman theory of strict liability to apply only to personal injury
cases. Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. Later versions of strict liability have
brought property damage and other physical injuries within the scope of strict liability. See,
e.g., Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 329-30 (Alaska
1981) (component part damage due to defect in whole product recoverable under strict
liability); Hoover & Son v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. 1969) (loss of
cattle caused by use of defective antibiotic animal serum recoverable under strict liability);
City of LaCrosse v. Schubert, 72 Wis. 2d 38, __ , 240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1976) (property
damage and repair costs resulting from use of defective product recoverable under strict
liability). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
' See 1982 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4015 (cases from states which have accepted
strict liability in tort); 1982 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4016 (chart of states which have ac-
1983]
874 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Strict liability in tort arose from considerations of public policy and
does not depend on either manufacturer or consumer intent." Strict
liability is a consumer protection device and exists to provide consumers
with a simple and sure remedy against manufacturers of defective" and
unreasonably dangerous" products."3 The courts have adopted strict
cepted strict liability in tort). As of May 1982, 47 of 50 states have accepted some form of
strict liability in tort. Id. See generally Henderson, Extending the Boundries of Strict Pro-
ducts Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036
(1980); Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681,
681-82 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Strict Liability Policies]; The Fall, supra note 2, at 804;
Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and
Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Section 402A
Preemption].
10 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, -, 403 P.2d 145, 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
22-23 (1965) (intent of parties is irrelevant in strict products liability action); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962)
(strict liability does not stem from contractual intent); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor
Sales, Inc., 162 Mont. 506, __ , 513 P.2d 268, 273 (1973) (strict liability arose from re-
quirements of public policy). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, com-
ment m (1965); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1140-43 (1960) [hereinafter cited as The Assault]; Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826-27 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Strict Liability Nature].
"I See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991, 994 (Ala. 1981)
(plaintiff must show product defect to prove prima facie case in strict products liability);
Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr. 121 Ariz. 253, __, 589 P.2d 896, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)
(showing of product design defect fulfills defective condition requirement of § 402A); Ford
Motor Co. v. Hill, 381 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979) (showing of either manufacturing
or design defect fulfills defective condition of § 402A), aff'd, 404 So.2d 1049 (1981); Lewis v.
Bucyrus-Erie, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Mo. 1981) (plaintiff who cannot show product defect
is ineligible for strict liability relief); International Harvester Co. v. Zavala, 623 S.W.2d 699,
707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (showing of manufacturing defect fulfills defective condition re-
quirement of § 402A). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g
(1965); Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U.
CIN. L. REv. 101 (1977); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking
Some Products Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977); Strict Liability Nature,
supra note 10, at 832-33.
12 See 1982 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4065 (cases from jurisdictions which have re-
quired that products be unreasonably dangerous to vest their manufacturers with strict
liability); 1982 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4016 (states which have required the
unreasonably dangerous requirement in their strict liability applications). As of May 1982,
40 of the 47 states which accept strict liability also require products to be unreasonably
dangerous. Id. But see Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 214
(Alaska 1975) (Restatement § 402A unreasonably dangerous requirement is not adhered to
in Alaska); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972) (unreasonably dangerous requirement places unreasonable burden on
plaintiff); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, __ , 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1978) (strict
liability plaintiff in Pennsylvania need not prove that product was unreasonably dangerous
to receive relief). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §" 402A, comment i (1965).
13 See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 748, 127
Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (1976) (strict liability applies only to consumer transactions). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Strict Liability Policies, supra note 9, at
681-85; Strict Liability Nature, supra note 10, at 825-27.
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liability on the ground that modern consumers cannot protect
themselves adequately from defective products." The courts which
adopt strict liability also note that product manufacturers, through
advertising, represent their products as safe to the public and thus
should bear the costs of injuries that result from defective products.15
Strict liability does not displace, however, the traditional negligence
and contractual theories of relief. 6 In particular, a majority of courts
have held that the contractual warranty provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) should serve as the basis for relief when a plaintiff's
losses are purely economic. Pure economic harm includes loss of profits,
" See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d at 746-48, 127
Cal. Rptr. at 844-45 (strict liability exists to protect consumers who lack bargaining power
and ability to discern product defects); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d at
63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (strict liability is needed because the law of commer-
cial transactions does not properly protect consumers). See generally Strict Liability
Policies, supra note 9 at 681-87; The Fall, supra note 2, at 800-05.
'" Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc., 97 Ariz. 280, -, 399 P.2d 681, 686-87
(1965) (Lockwood, J., concurring) (consumer vigilance has decreased because of advertising,
marketing devices, and trademarks). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, comment c (1965) (by marketing product, seller assumes special responsibility
toward any consumer who may sustain injury due to defect in product); Strict Liability
Policies, supra note 9, at 681-87; The Fall, supra note 2, at 800-05.
"6 See Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 621 F.2d 715, 718 (5th Cir. 1980) (using Texas law
governing commercial transactions and strict liability) (relief under implied warranty provis-
ions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is broader than relief under strict liability);
Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, -, 437 S.W.2d 459,
462-63 (1969) (removing privity requirement allows recovery of economic and commercial
losses under contract theory when strict liability is inapplicable); Pierce v. Liberty Fur-
niture Co., 141 Ga. App. 175, __ , 233 S.E.2d 33, 35-36 (1977) (UCC provides consumers
with broader remedy than strict liability and does not require goods to be unreasonably
dangerous). Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (1977) (elimination of
horizontal privity requirement in UCC implied warranty cases affords aggrieved party con-
tractual relief that he could not receive under strict liability); Titus, Restatement (Second)
of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713, 755 (1970).
The trend toward removing the horizontal privity requirement of implied warranty actions
has produced a products liability remedy under the UCC that affords a greater degree of
protection in many instances to buyers than strict liability. Id. at 755-59. Horizontal privity
implies a direct buyer-to-seller contractual relationship. Id. at 755. If horizontal privity is
not an element of an implied warranty act, remote users of a product who were not the
original purchasers of the product may receive implied warranty protection. Id. at 755-59,
Section 402A Preemption, supra note 9, at 130-41. The doctrine of strict liability is not
statutory law and thus cannot interfere with the allocation of commercial risks as provided
by UCC statutory law. Id. at 123-26. Only the UCC should provide relief for plaintiffs who
suffer economic or commercial loss. Id. at 130-41; see also Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md.,
Inc., 418 A.2d 968, (Del. 1980) (strict liability is unconstitutional because it violates statutory
law in UCC). See generally Section 402A Preemption, supra note 9, at 130-36; Note, Strict
Liability and Warranty in Consumer Protection The Broader Protection of the U. C. C. in
Cases Involving Economic Loss, Used Goods, and Non-dangerous Defective Goods, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1982).
17 See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 285-86 (Alaska 1976)
(strict liability relief denied in case involving direct economic loss); Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21
Ariz. App. 14, -, 515 P.2d 41, 44 (1973) (loss of bargain recovery denied under strict
1983]
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loss of bargain, and other consequential damages caused by product
failure or defectiveness. 8 Economic harm does not include physical harm
to the plaintiff's property caused by the defective product. 9 Physical
harm to the plaintiff's property is recoverable under strict liability in
tort. ° Most courts also refuse to allow strict liability relief when the par-
ties to a products liability action are commercial entities2 who have
liability); Long Mfg., N.C., Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga. App. 320, 322, 231 S.E.2d 105,
107-08 (1976) (tobacco farmer denied recovery for lost profits under strict liability); Alfred
N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 203-04, 364 N.E.2d 100, 107 (1977)
(recovery denied for economic losses sustained due to air conditioner breakdown); Richards
v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc. 384 N.E.2d 1084, 1092-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (UCC provides
only available remedy when injuries are strictly diminution in product's market value);
Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) (policies underly-
ing strict liability do not support extension of strict liability to economic loss); Gibson v.
Reliable Chevrolet, 608 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (strict liability relief denied to
plaintiff whose automobile decreased in value due to a design defect); Hole v. General
Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715, 716-17, 442 N.Y.S.2d 638, 641 (1981) (strict liability relief
denied to automobile owner who sustained economic loss due to frame defect); Nobility
Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. 1977) (strict liability relief denied to
owner of mobile home which decreased in value due to production error). But see Cova v.
Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, -, 182 N.W.2d 800, 809-11 (1970) (strict
liability relief allowed to purchaser of golf carts which lost value due to production defect);
Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, __ , 207 A.2d 305, 312-13 (1965) (strict
liability relief allowed to purchaser of carpeting which emitted strong odor and was unmer-
chantable). See generally Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of
Judicial Confusion Between Contract and Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1978).
S See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, _, 403 P.2d 145, 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 22-23 (1965) (economic loss not recoverable under strict liability includes diminution in
value of truck due to design defect); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App.
3d 194, 203-04, 364 N.E.2d 100, 107 (1977) (lost profits due to air conditioner failure not
recoverable under strict liability); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, __ , 398
S.W.2d 240, 248-49 (1966) (consequential damages from defective tractor not recoverable
under strict liability). See generally, R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 4.22 (1974 & Supp. 1980); Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the
UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309 (1973).
19 See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, __ , 403 P.2d 145, 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 22-23 (1965) (property damage to plaintiff's truck recoverable under strict liability in tort
but plaintiffs lost profits not recoverable); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 455 S.W.2d
825, 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (tangible property damage to mobile home recoverable under
strict liability but diminution in value losses are not).
' Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, __ , 391 P.2d 168, 170, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 898 (1964) (damages to automobile caused by defective part recoverable under
strict liability); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, __ , 238 A.2d 169, 175
(1968) (water damage to house caused by defective water meter recoverable under strict
liability); Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 262 Or. 293, _ 498 P.2d 766,771-74 (1972) (property
damage caused by defective electric blanket which caught fire recoverable under strict
liability). See generally HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 18, § 4.20 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
"I See U.C.C. § 2-104(1). In the context of their transaction, the parties to a commercial
transaction are "merchants" as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. Commercial
parties are transacting parties who stand in contractual privity with one another, bargain
the specifications of the item sold, possess relatively the same bargaining power, and
negotiate the ancilliary aspects of their transaction. Id.; see also Southwest Forest Indus.,
[Vol. 40:459
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entered into a contract.' Commercial entities can allocate risks
associated with their contractual endeavors and can bargain away any
implied warranties.' In commercial transactions, plaintiffs therefore
must seek recovery of damages under the UCC.' In Purvis v. Con-
solidated Energy Products Co.,' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that strict liability relief should not be available to a tobacco
farmer who suffered severe crop damage by attempting to cure his
tobacco in a defective curing barn on the grounds that the tobacco
farmer entered into a commercial contract with the barn's
manufacturer. 8
In Purvis, South Carolina tobacco farmer Preston B. Purvis, after in-
vestigating a number of bulk curing barns, purchased six curing barns
from the barns' manufacturer, Consolidated Energy Products Company
(CEPCO). Purvis was familiar with tobacco farming and curing and had
operated his 600 acre farm for at least nineteen years.' Before purchas-
Inc. v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
902 (1970) (commercial parties possess knowledge of trade practices within the scope of trans-
action, possess equal bargaining power, and can negotiate sales contract freely). See
generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 9-6, 345-49.
1 See, e.g., Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936,
93940 (2d Cir. 1980) (strict liability relief is inappropriate when extended to commercially
transacting parties); Scandanavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 429
(9th Cir. 1979) (commercial buyers should seek their relief in the law of commercial trans-
actions and not in strict liability); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 596 F.2d
924, 927-28 (9th Cir. 1979) (large corporate entities who contract as merchants should not
receive strict liability relief); Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 755-56
(3d Cir. 1976) (strict liability does not apply to commercial transactions); Delta Airlines v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975)
(policies underlying strict liability do not allow application to large corporate transactions);
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfr., 360 F. Supp. 25, 32 (S.D. Iowa 1973)
(commercially transacting parties must seek legal redress in the warranty provisions of the
UCC); K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co., 273 Or. 242, -, 541 P.2d 1378, 1383-84 (1975)
(strict liability relief is inappropriate in commercial transactions); K & C, Inc. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, -, 263 A.2d 390, 393 (1970) (commercial buyers
do not deserve strict liability protection).
See U.C.C. § 2-316 (parties to commercial transactions can exclude or modify any ex-
press or implied warranties existing in goods sold); U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (limitations or exclu-
sions on implied warranties are acceptable in commercial transactions but are prima facie
unconscionable in consumer transactions). See generally STEINHEIMER, supra note 4, at
230-32.
" See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 748, 127
Cal. Rptr. 838, (1976) (strict liability relief is inappropriate when applied to commercial
transactions); Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013,
1020 (9th Cir. 1970) (doctrine of strict liability does not apply between commercial parties
who contract in commercial setting from positions of parity in bargaining power), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); see also supra text accompanying note 22.
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ing the barns, Purvis conferred for several hours with a CEPCO repre-
sentative about purchase terms and express warranties.' CEPCO war-
ranted that the barns were free from defects but restricted its liability
to repair and replacement of defective parts."0
Purvis used the CEPCO barns and immediately experienced diffi-
culty in obtaining satisfactory cures. 1 Although CEPCO attempted to
aid Purvis by providing field consultation and curing instructions, Pur-
vis' experience with the barns remained unsatisfactory for the re-
mainder of the season.2 After attempting to use the barns for a year,
Purvis brought suit against CEPCO in federal district court' alleging
fraud, breach of express and implied warranties, and strict products
liability.' The district court deferred judgment on the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment and allowed the jury to hear evidence. 5
Upon CEPCO's renewed motions for summary judgment, the court
directed verdicts for the defendant on the fraud and breach of warranty
counts and submitted the case to the jury on the strict liability claim."
' Id.; see Brief of Appellant at 4, Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prod. Co., 674 F.2d
217 (4th Cir. 1982). Appellant stressed in its brief the amount of negotiation, discussion, and
investigation which the parties engaged in before contracting. Id. Appellee chose to avoid
mentioning these events in its brief for strategic reasons. Brief of Appellee at 3-4, Purvis v.
Consolidated Energy Prod. Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982).
674 F.2d at 218. Purvis freely accepted the restricted warranty from CEPCO. Id.
Id. In describing the causes behind Purvis' inability to obtain successful cures of his
tobacco, the appellant's and appellee's versions of the facts diverge. Id. at 218 n.2. Appellant
suggested that Purvis used a method of loading the tobacco into the barns that was inconsist-
ent with the manufacturer's instructions. Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 5. Purvis
argued that he followed the manufacturer's instructions. Brief of Appellee, supra note 29, at
2. Both parties agree that Purvis' tobacco was useless and unmerchantable after the at-
tempted curing. Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 6; Brief of Appellee, supra note 29, at
3.
674 F.2d at 218.
' Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 2. Purvis commenced his action against CEPCO
in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. 674 F.2d at 217; Brief
of Appellant, supra note 29, at 2.
674 F.2d at 219.
Id. The district court deferred judgment on CEPCO's motion for summary judgment
to allow the jury to determine if a genuine issue of material fact existed between the plain-
tiffs and defendant's version of the facts. Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 3; see FED.
R. Civ. P. 56. If no genuine issue of material fact exists, a court will render judgment in
favor of a party moving for summary judgment if the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Id. See generally Lemley, Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Its Use and Abuse, 11 ARK. L. REV. 138 (1957); Louis,
Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974).
36 674 F.2d at 219. The jury determined that the facts did not support any indication of
fraud on CEPCO's part. Id. The jury also found that Purvis was ineligible for warranty
relief under the South Carolina commercial code because of a lack of notice as required
under South Carolina's version of the UCC. Brief for Appellant at 3; see S.C. CODE §
36-2-607(3) (1976) (notice requirement).
[Vol. 40:459
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The jury awarded Purvis $57,722.94 on his strict liability claim and CEPCO
appealed the adverse judgment to the Fourth Circuit."
The Fourth Circuit in Purvis reversed the decision of the district
court 8 and determined that Purvis did not qualify for strict liability pro-
tection. 9 The Purvis court found that strict liability was applicable only
to consumer transactions 0 and held that Purvis' contracting with CEPCO
was a commercial transaction. 41 The Purvis court also found that strict
liability attaches to only "unreasonably dangerous 4 2 products43 and
determined that the CEPCO curing barns were not unreasonably
dangerous.44
In denying Purvis strict liability relief, the Fourth Circuit held that
strict liability protects only consumers who are powerless to protect
themselves from injuries caused by defective products.4 5 The Purvis
court observed that consumers do not examine products routinely before
use,4" do not appreciate all warranty limitations existing in the
products,47 and fully expect the products to be safe.48 The Fourth Circuit
determined that commercial buyers, on the other hand, can protect
themselves by negotiating the allocation of risks with the seller for a
more favorable price and thus do not deserve strict liability protection.49
' 674 F.2d at 219. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, CEPCO argued that Purvis should
not receive strict liability relief on the grounds that the sale of the curing barns was a com-
mercial transaction. Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 9-13. CEPCO further argued the
curing barns were not unreasonably dangerous as required by the South Carolina strict
liability statute. Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 25-30; see infra text accompanying
notes 68-72. (Fourth Circuit determines that barns were not unreasonably dangerous). Pur-
vis did not appeal the directed verdicts against him on the fraud and breach of warranty
claims. 674 F.2d at 219. Purvis offered no explanation for the decision not to appeal the
directed verdicts against him. Brief for Appellee, supra note 29, at 6-15.
674 F.2d at 218.
Id. at 223.
40 Id. at 220, 223; see infra text accompanying notes 53-58.
" 674 F.2d at 223; see infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
42 674 F.2d at 222-23; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965)
(unreasonably dangerous product is dangerous beyond ordinary consumer's contemplation).
See generally HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 18, § 4:14; Strict Liability Nature, supra note 10,
at 832-34.
674 F.2d at 210; see infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
" 674 F.2d at 223; see infra text accompanying note 72.
674 F.2d at 219. The Purvis court relied on Judge Traynor's strict liability rationale
contained in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products in holding that strict liability is ap-
propriate because of consumer inability to discern product defects. Id.; see Greenman, 59
Cal.2d at __, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (strict liability is necessary to protect
consumers against latent product defects); see also supra notes 7-8 (explanation of Green-
man holding).
674 F.2d at 219-20.
" 674 F.2d at 220.
48 Id.
4" Id. at 221-22. A commercial buyer bargains specifications and warranties with the
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To determine whether Purvis acted as a consumer or a commercial party
in his purchase of the CEPCO barns, the Purvis court relied upon the
opinion of the California Court of Appeals in Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.'5 The Fourth Circuit decided to follow
Kaiser Steel after taking notice of the lack of South Carolina strict
liability precedent." Kaiser Steel, the Fourth Circuit determined, was
the leading case on point dealing with the applicability of strict liability
to commercial transactions."
The Kaiser Steel court developed a four-part test for distinguishing
between consumer and commercial entities for purposes of strict liability
application.0 Under the Kaiser Steel test, parties who deal in a commer-
cial setting,4 contract from positions of relatively equal economic
strength," bargain the specifications of the product,56 and negotiate the
risk of loss from defects in the product57 are commercial entities and are
ineligible for strict liability relief.' Although the Fourth Circuit did not
find that all four elements of the Kaiser Steel test were present in Pur-
vis," the Fourth Circuit determined that Purvis qualified as a commer-
cial entity and refused to award strict liability relief."
manufacturer, can discern production defects in the product and thereby mitigate injury,
does not rely entirely upon the manufacturer's marketing claims, and can seek relief under
the warranty provisions of the UCC. Id.
' 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976). The California Court of Appeals in
Kaiser Steel held that the contractual law of warranty and not the tort-based doctrine of
strict liability should provide legal remedy to aggrieved commercial buyers. Id. at 748, 127
Cal. Rptr. at 845. The Kaiser Steel court found that strict liability relief was unnecessary
due to the existence of privity between the parties. Id. at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845. The
Kaiser Steel court also found that the application of strict liability to commercial trans-
action products liability would not induce the seller to design and produce safe products
since, in such transactions, the buyer and seller normally negotiate specifications. Id. at 748,
127 Cal. Rptr. at 845; Henderson, supra note 9, at 1041-44. In situations in which the buyer
and seller negotiate product specifications, application of strict liability relief may reduce
overall product safety. Henderson, supra note 9, at 1038.
" 674 F.2d at 218. Since 1974, when the South Carolina state legislature enacted §
402A into law, the South Carolina Supreme Court has heard only twelve cases dealing with
strict liability in tort. Products Liability-Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C. L.
REV. 107-17 (1979). None of the twelve cases dealt with the application of strict liability to
commercial transactions. Id.
674 F.2d at 220.
55 Cal. App. 3d at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845; see infra text accompanying notes
54-57. (Kaiser Steel four-part test).
' 55 Cal. App. 3d at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845. Parties who deal in a commercial set-
ting can seek relief under the warranty provisions of the UCC because of privity of con-
tract existing in their transaction. Id.
ss Id.
56 Id.
' Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-719. Parties to a commercial transaction can modify or limit the ef-
fect of any implied warranties by negotiation. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
ss 55 Cal. App. 3d at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
5 674 F.2d at 223; see infra text accompanying notes 90-93 (Purvis only met two parts
of Kaiser Steel four-part test).
' 674 F.2d at 223; see id. n.11. The Purvis court did not deem the parity in economic
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As an alternative ground for denying strict liability relief, the
Fourth Circuit found that Purvis qualified as a commercial entity by
knowingly and voluntarily accepting a commercial risk." In suggesting a
second method for distinguishing between consumer and commercial
parties, the Purvis court declared that the nature of the risk and not the
nature of the parties determines the applicability of strict liability
relief.2 The Fourth Circuit found that Purvis knew of the risks
associated with the use of the CEPCO barns 3 and freely chose to cure
his tobacco in the barns in spite of the known risks." The Purvis court
used the "nature of the risk"65 analysis in denying Purvis strict liability
relief but expressly declared that reliance upon the Kaiser Steel test dic-
tated the outcome in Purvis."
Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that the CEPCO barns in question
were not unreasonably dangerous. 7 The Fourth Circuit determined that
South Carolina law requires products to be unreasonably dangerous to
invoke strict liability.' The Purvis court held that a product is
unreasonably dangerous when an ordinary consumer could not with or-
dinary knowledge discern the danger inherent in the product." The Pur-
vis court found that the CEPCO barns were defective and inefficient at




The Fourth Circuit held that since Purvis assumed commercial risks
strength and specification-bargaining aspects of the Kaiser Steel test important in deter-
mining whether the policies underlying strict liability attach to a product. Id. The Purvis
court considered that the commercial setting and negotiation elements of the test embodied
the essence of the Kaiser Steel limitation on strict liability. Id. at 223. See also infra text ac-
companying notes 90-94.
674 F.2d at 223.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 218-19; see Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 4. Purvis knew that use of the
CEPCO barns, by curing larger quantities of tobacco faster, could reduce the quality of his
tobacco cures. Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 4-5.
" 674 F.2d at 218, 223; Brief of Appellant, supra note 29, at 4-5. But see 674 F.2d at 224
(Hall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the majority in Purvis erred by concluding
that Purvis possessed bargaining power parity with CEPCO. Id. The dissent also suggested
that Purvis could not possibly examine all of the aspects involved in purchasing and using
the CEPCO barns. Id.
I See id. at 222; infra text accompanying notes 109-115 (explaining nature of the risk
analysis).
674 F.2d at 223.
'7 Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 219; see Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171, 176, 246 S.E.2d 176,
178 (1978) (strict liability application requires unreasonably dangerous finding); Young v.
Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242 S.E.2d 671, 679 (1978) (product must be unreasonably
dangerous to vest manufacturer with strict liability); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op.
1976) (South Carolina enactment of § 402A includes unreasonably dangerous requirement).
0 674 F.2d at 222-23; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965)
(article must be unreasonably dangerous beyond contemplation of ordinary consumer).
" 674 F.2d at 223.
71 Id.
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in contracting with CEPCO, 2 Purvis should have sought any appropriate
relief under the implied warranty provisions of the UCC.7 3 The Fourth
Circuit found that Purvis freely accepted CEPCO's limited warranty
4
and determined that the contractual provisions containing the limited
warranty acted to bar strict products liability. 5 Furthermore, the Purvis
court held that when a loss results from mere product ineffectiveness,
the law of contracts and commercial transactions fixes responsibility for
the loss. 6 The Purvis court, however, did not declare that strict liability
relief never could be available to commercial plaintiffs.7 The Fourth Cir-
cuit stated that strict liability relief may be appropriate when commer-
cial buyers purchase products as consumers and thereafter sustain in-
jury from use of the product since in this situation the nature of the
buyers' risk would not be commercial."
The dissenting opinion in Purvis disagreed with the majority's
determination that the CEPCO barns were merely inefficient and not
72 Id.; see supra note 49. (definition of commercial party).
7 674 F.2d at 222-23; see supra note 5 (implied warranty provisions of the UCC).
, 674 F.2d at 218; see supra text accompanying notes 29-30. (CEPCO limited warranty
on curing barns).
" 674 F.2d at 223. In holding that the CEPCO limited warranty acted to bar strict pro-
ducts liability, the Purvis court implicitly found that the CEPCO warranty provisions were
not unconscionable. See id.; U.C.C. § 2-302(1). Courts may strike unconscionable clauses and
modifications of implied warranties from a contract and enforce the contract as if the un-
conscionable clause never existed. Id. Parties to a contract may modify or limit damages
subject to unconscionability constraints. Id. § 2-719; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244
Ark. 883, -, 430 S.W.2d 778, 781 (1968) (express disclaimer of all implied warranties in
automobile sales contract held unconscionable); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960) (written disclaimer held unconscionable); Jefferson
Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 142, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394-95 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969)
(automotive warranty limitation held unconscionable). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 4, §§ 4-2 to 4-9, at 149-173 (1980); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 516-28 (1967).
11 674 F.2d at 223; see Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1248-50
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981) (doctrine of strict liability is not applicable to
defect in product which only decreases product efficiency); Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 666-67 (5th Cir. 1971) (law of commercial transactions
governs legal redress available to plaintiff whose cattle fail to gain weight when fed defend-
ant's feed); Brown v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 475-76, 521 P.2d 537, 542 (1974)
(courts should not extend doctrine of strict liability to cover losses caused by product inef-
fectiveness).
, 674 F.2d at 222.
78 Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that, in the context of some product purchases,
commercial parties function essentially as consumers and rely upon the manufacturer's duty
to produce safe products. Id. In such cases, commercial buyers deserve the same strict
liability protections as consumers. Id.; see Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572
S.W.2d 320, 325-27 (Tex. 1978) (commercial plaintiff who purchases consumer good without
formal negotiation with manufacturer is eligible for strict liability relief); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment d (1965) (strict liability extends to any ultimate
user or consumer).
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unreasonably dangerous. 79 The dissent argued that the majority erred in
setting aside the jury's strict liability award without holding that the
jury's unreasonably dangerous finding was clearly erroneous." Addi-
tionally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's use of and reliance
upon the Kaiser Steel test.8 The dissent argued that the Kaiser Steel
limitation on strict liability applies only to large corporate enterprises
and does not extend to small commercial operations such as farming.82
While the Kaiser Steel test is the leading case on identification of
commercial entities for purposes of strict liability application,' few
courts outside of California have accepted the Kaiser Steel test." Until
the Fourth Circuit's Purvis opinion, the only federal appellate courts
which had adopted the Kaiser Steel test were the Ninth" and Second"
Circuits. Other courts have formulated tests analogous to the Kaiser
Steel test and have determined that strict liability protection does not
extend to commercial parties." Courts applying Pennsylvania law have
674 F.2d at 224; see infra text accompanying notes 79-80.
674 F.2d at 224; see FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (appellate court shall not set aside jury find-
ings of fact unless such facts are clearly erroneous); see also United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948) (explaining clearly erroneous rule). A finding of fact
is clearly erroneous when, although evidence exists to support the finding, the appellate
court determines with a definite and firm conviction that the finding is incorrect. Id. at 395.
81 674 F.2d at 224; see infra text accompanying notes 83, 90-91.
674 F.2d at 224. The Purvis dissent relied on the Ninth Circuit's holding in S.A. Em-
presa v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1981), to support the proposition that the
Kaiser Steel limitation on strict liability should apply only to large corporate enterprises.
674 F.2d at 224. In addition, the Purvis dissent disagreed with the majority's determination
that farming constitutes a "commercial activity" for purposes of strict liability application.
674 F.2d at 224. The dissent argued that the classification of farming as a commercial activity
was unduly harsh to Purvis. Id.
8 See 55 Cal. App. 3d at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845. The Kaiser Steel test involves a
four-part process to determine availability of strict liability relief. Id.; supra text accompa-
nying notes 54-58. (explanation of Kaiser Steel test). The Kaiser Steel test is easy to apply
and does not require any detailed factual information. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr.
at 845; see also infra note 84 (jurisdictions which have accepted Kaiser Steel test).
8" See S.A. Empresa v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1981) (accepting
Kaiser Steel test); Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936,
939-40 (2d Cir. 1980) (accepting Kaiser Steel test); Rocky Mountain Helicopters Inc. v. Bell
Helicopter Co., 491 F. Supp. 611, 614-15 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (accepting Kaiser Steel test).
See S.A. Empresa v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1981) (accepting
Kaiser Steel test) (using California law); Scandanavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft
Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 428-29 (9th Cir. 1979) (accepting Kaiser Steel test) (using California law);
Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 927-28 (9th Cir. 1979) (accepting
Kaiser Steel test) (using Idaho law).
" See Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936, 939-40
(2d Cir. 1980) (accepting Kaiser Steel test) (using New York law).
' E.g. Delta Air Lines Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (parties eligible for implied warranty protection are exempt
from strict liability relief) (using Georgia law); Ebasco Serv., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co., 460 F. Supp. 163, 223-26 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (strict liability does not apply to parties in
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recognized that strict liability relief is appropriate only to buyers who
lack the ability or power to bargain with their sellers.' Courts applying
Iowa law refuse to award strict liability relief to buyers who purchase
goods in traditionally commercial settings. 9
In applying the Kaiser Steel test, the Fourth Circuit correctly found
that Purvis dealt in a commercial setting" and negotiated risks of loss
with CEPCO,91' but did not determine whether Purvis dealt with CEPCO
from a position of relatively equal economic strength92 or bargained the
specifications of the curing barns. 3 The Fourth Circuit did not consider
the parity in economic strength and specification-bargaining elements of
the Kaiser Steel test significant in determining that Purvis was a com-
mercial entity. 4 Although the Purvis court, in effect, disregarded one
half of the Kaiser Steel test, the Purvis court claimed to follow Kaiser
Steel in denying Purvis strict liability relief.
a commercial setting) (using Pennsylvania law); Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus., Inc., 395
F. Supp. 506, 514-15 (N.D. Iowa 1975) (losses incurred in commercial ventures not
recoverable under strict liability) (using Iowa law); Noel Transfer & Package Delivery
Serv., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F. Supp. 968, 970-71 (D. Minn. 1972) (economic losses
suffered by commercial parties not recoverable under strict liability) (using Minnesota law).
" See, e.g., Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1976)
(commercial parties who modify or limit implied warranties in a product are not eligible for
strict liability relief) (using Pennsylvania law); Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v.
Greenville Business Men's Ass'n, 423 Pa. 288, __, 224 A.2d 620, 623-24 (1966) (buyers
who bargain away or limit implied warranties are ineligible for strict liability protection).
" See, e.g., Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506, 514-15 (N.D.
Iowa 1975) (losses incurred in commercial venture not recoverable under strict liability);
Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25, 32 (S.D. Iowa
1973) (strict liability inapplicable between parties who function properly in commercial set-
ting).
go See 674 F.2d at 218. Purvis contracted directly with a representative of CEPCO and
negotiated a sales contract. Id.
" See id. Purvis negotiated the sales contract with CEPCO and accepted the limited
warranty that CEPCO inserted into the contract. Id.
I See id. at 218-19. Purvis did not possess the economic strength of CEPCO. Id. Purvis
owned a medium-sized tobacco farm in rural South Carolina. Id. CEPCO was a division of
the Condec Corporation, whose gross revenues in 1981 were $275,000,000. STANDARD AND
POOR'S REGISTER OF CORPORATIONS 564 (1982).
" See 674 F.2d at 218. The CEPCO barns were prefabricated and were not built to
order. Id.
" 674 F.2d at 223 n.11. The Purvis court deemed the parity in economic strength and
specification-bargaining considerations insignificant elements of the Kaiser Steel test. Id.
The Purvis court found that bargaining power disparity is important only in instances in
which a seller can impose an adhesion contract. Id. Additionally, the Purvis court determined
that product specification-bargaining has no bearing on the question of whether the policies
underlying strict liability attach to a given product. Id.; see Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 60, 377
P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (policies underlying strict liability); supra note 8 (explana-
tion of Greenman holding).
91 674 F.2d at 223. The Fourth Circuit's declaration that the Purvis holding followed
from Kaiser Steel in light of the Fourth Circuit's treatment of the Kaiser Steel test is
highly suspect. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60, 90-93. Apparently, the Purvis
[Vol. 40:459
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
In addition, the Fourth Circuit's reliance upon the Kaisei Steel
analysis is questionable in light of the facts in Purvis and prior applica-
tions of the Kaiser Steel test." Purvis' farming operation was not a large
corporate enterprise' and courts that have applied the Kaiser Steel test
have agreed that the Kaiser Steel limitation on strict liability applies only
to large corporate enterprises. 8 By applying the Kaiser Steel test to a
case involving a non-corporate buyer, the Fourth Circuit extended the
Kaiser Steel limitation to a previously unaffected class.' Also, since
South Carolina had enacted Restatement of Torts section 402A into
statutory law,00 the Fourth Circuit had an obligation to decide Purvis
with deference toward the section 402A version of strict liability.' °
Kaiser Steel is a California case and California does not accept section
402A or the unreasonably dangerous requirement embodied in section
402A.11 In following Kaiser Steel, the Fourth Circuit relied on a legal
analysis unrelated to South Carolina law or precedent.03 For the above
reasons, the value of Kaiser Steel as precedent in the Fourth Circuit is
uncertain. 0'
court believed that it could follow Kaiser Steel without applying the full four-part Kaiser
Steel test. See supra note 94 (Purvis court treatment of Kaiser Steel test).
See supra notes 84-86 (cases accepting Kaiser Steel analysis); infra text accompany-
ing notes 97-98.
674 F.2d at 218. Purvis' farming operation was a sole proprietorship that encompassed
tobacco growing and curing on a 600 acre farm. Id.
" See supra notes 84-86 (cases accepting Kaiser Steel analysis).
" See id. No court yet has applied the Kaiser Steel limitation on strict liability to
either a sole proprietorship or farming operation. Id.
11" 674 F.2d at 219; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976). South Carolina has
enacted § 402A and the official comments to § 402A into statutory law. S.C. CODE § 15-73-30
(1976). Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
"I See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938) (federal courts sitting in divers-
ity have obligation to apply substantive law of forum state). See generally Ely, The Ir-
repressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693 (1974); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 383 (1964).
" See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 135, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 443 (1972) (unreasonably dangerous criterion is not element of California strict
liability).
" See supra notes 68, 100 (unreasonably dangerous criterion is an element of South
Carolina strict liability).
I" See supra text accompanying notes 96-103. At best, the Kaiser Steel analysis will re-
tain precedential value until the state supreme courts within the jurisdiction of the Fourth
Circuit render opinions on the availability of strict liability relief to commercial parties. Id.
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Although the facts in Purvis did not allow for a determination that
Purvis was a commercial entity under a strict application of all four
parts of the Kaiser Steel test,"5 the facts did allow for a determination
that Purvis was a commercial entity under the Fourth Circuit's nature of
the risk analysis.' The Fourth Circuit's nature of the risk analysis is, in
essence, a distillation of the Kaiser Steel test 7 that embodies general
strict liability policy."8 The nature of the risk analysis is an amalgama-
tion of the two parts of the Kaiser Steel test that the Purvis court found
significant. 9 In applying the Kaiser Steel test, the Fourth Circuit found
that Purvis dealt in a commercial setting" and negotiated risk of loss
with CEPCO,"' and determined, based upon these findings, that Purvis
had accepted a commercial risk."' Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's
nature of the risk analysis is consistent with the policy considerations
underlying strict liability by providing strict liability relief to consumers
and denying strict liability relief to parties who knowingly accept com-
mercial risks."'
In addition to denying Purvis strict liability relief because Purvis ac-
cepted a commercial risk, the Fourth Circuit found another ground for
denying Purvis strict liability relief by determining that the CEPCO
barns in question were not unreasonably dangerous."' In order for the
CEPCO bars to have been unreasonably dangerous as defined by com-
ment i to section 402A of the Restatement,"5 the barns must have been
"05 See 674 F.2d at 220; supra text accompanying notes 59, 90-95. The Fourth Circuit
found that Purvis met only two parts of the Kasier Steel four part test. 674 F.2d at 223 n.11.
101 See infra text accompanying notes 110-112 (Purvis accepted commercial risks).
107 674 F.2d at 222-223; see infra text accompanying notes 109-12.
See Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 60-61, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01
(policies underlying strict liability); supra note 8 (explanation of Greenman holding).
11 674 F.2d at 223 n.11. The Purvis court determined that the commercial setting and
negotiation of risk elements of the Kaiser Steel test contained the essence of the Kaiser
Steel test; see infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
110 674 F.2d at 218; see supra note 90 (commercial setting element).
"' 674 F.2d at 218; see supra note 91 (negotiation of risk element).
112 674 F.2d at 223; see supra note 49 (explanation of commercial risk).
" See supra text accompanying notes 10-15 (analysis of policy considerations underly-
ing strict liability); supra text accompanying notes 45-49 (reasons for allowing strict liability
relief to consumers and for denying strict liability relief to commercial parties).
"' 674 F.2d at 223. If the CEPCO barns in question were not unreasonably dangerous,
Purvis could not receive strict liability relief under § 402A regardless of whether the
Fourth Circuit considered his transaction with CEPCO a consumer or commercial transac-
tion. See supra note 100 (South Carolina strict liability statute); supra note 68 (unreasonably
dangerous criterion is element of South Carolina strict liability).
"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965). Comment i, in part,
provides that a product must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
templated by the ordinary purchasing consumer in order to be unreasonably dangerous. Id.
Comment i suggests that goods in their normal marketable form are usually not
unreasonably dangerous. Id. The presence of a design defect or latent contamination in an
otherwise normal product can render a product unreasonably dangerous because a con-
sumer would not ordinarily contemplate such dangers. Id.
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dangerous beyond any of Purvis' contemplations."' Therefore, if Purvis
knew of the risk that the CEPCO barns might destroy his tobacco, the
barns were not unreasonably dangerous."7 The facts in Purvis do not in-
dicate that Purvis knew that use of the CEPCO barns posed such a risk
to his tobacco."' Purvis knew that the CEPCO barns might diminish the
value of his tobacco by proving to be inefficient at curing, but did not
know that the barns might destroy the tobacco. 119 The Fourth Circuit
correctly noted, however, that the risks of ordinary product malfunction
and ineffectiveness are never beyond the contemplation of the buyer.20
In determining that the loss of Purvis' tobacco was due to curing
barn ineffectiveness, the Fourth Circuit blurred the distinction between
product ineffectiveness and product dangerousness.12" ' A majority of
courts which accept section 402A allow strict liability for property
damage when such damage is calamitous or total.'22 Under such cir-
cumstances, most courts deem the injury-causing product unreasonably
dangerous and allow relief under 402A.11 Most courts which accept sec-
tion 402A do not, however, allow strict liability recovery for property in-
jury when the injury to the item involves only partial damage or diminu-
tion in value.u In such cases, most courts consider the injury-causing
674 F.2d at 222.
117 See supra note 115. If Purvis knew of the substantial likelihood that the CEPCO
barns would destroy his tobacco, the barns would not be dangerous to an extent beyond his
contemplation. Id. Furthermore, if Purvis knew that the barns probably would destroy his
tobacco, CEPCO could argue that Purvis assumed the risk of crop damage. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965) (assumption of the risk defense is available to defend-
ants in strict liability actions).
116 See 674 F.2d at 218-19. The facts suggest that Purvis was an informed purchaser
and knew of the merits and drawbacks of the CEPCO barns, but do not suggest that Purvis
knew of any serious dangers in using the barns. Id. See also Brief of Appellant, supra note
29, at 4.
"' See 674 F.2d at 222-23 Purvis accepted the risk, as does any purchaser, of product
ineffectiveness. Id. Although the facts are silent on the degree of Purvis' knowledge, Purvis
undoubtedly would not have used the CEPCO barns if he suspected that the barns would
destroy his tobacco. Id.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 222-23; infra text accompanying notes 122-125.
1" See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1174-75 (3d Cir. 1981) (damages to tractor caused by defective part which caused fire
recoverable under strict liability); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, __
391 P.2d 168, 170, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898 (1964) (damages to automobile caused by defective
part recoverable under strict liability); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130,
140-41, 238 A.2d 169, 175 (1968) (water damage to house caused by defective water meter
recoverable under strict liability); Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 262 Or. 293, 498 P.2d 766,
771-72 (1972) (property damage caused by defective electric blanket which caught fire
recoverable under strict liability).
12 See supra note 122. Generally, courts which accept § 402A consider a product
unreasonably dangerous if the product inflicts sudden or severe damage upon the user's
property. Id. See generally HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 18, § 4.20 (1974 & 1980 Supp.).
' See, e.g., Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324,
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product inefficient and deny relief under section 402A on the grounds
that the injury involved only economic loss.12 The facts in Purvis,
however, are unique and only two other courts have considered the
availability of strict liability relief to cases involving crop damage caused
by defective farming equipment.128 In one case, the Montana Supreme
Court allowed strict liability relief to a farmer whose crops suffered
damage due to a faulty irrigation system." In the other case, the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals denied strict liability relief to a farmer whose
crops suffered damage due to a defective irrigation system on the
ground that crop loss was economic loss. 28 In the Texas case, however,
the crop losses were not total and the defective irrigation system caused
only a fifty per cent drop in crop yield." By classifying the total property
loss in Purvis as a product of curing barn ineffectiveness, the Fourth Cir-
cuit appears to have misconstrued the unreasonably dangerous require-
ment of section 402A.
13
0
In Purvis, the Fourth Circuit claimed to follow Kaiser Steel but
relied upon the nature of the risk analysis in denying Purvis strict liability
relief."' The Fourth Circuit's determination that Purvis qualified as a
commercial entity is correct under the nature of risk analysis. 2 Purvis
knew of the risks involved in using the CEPCO barns and was aware of
the chance that his tobacco might not cure well in the modern
prefabricated barns."' Purvis did not qualify, however, as a commercial
329-30 (Alaska 1981) (diminution in value damages to electric generator not recoverable
under strict liability); Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, __, 515 P.2d 41, 44 (1973)
(loss of bargain recovery denied under strict liability); Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141 Ga.
App. 671, 672, 234 S.E.2d 123, 124-25 (1977) (loss of bargain damages to automobile not
recoverable under strict liability); Wuench v. Ford Motor Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 317, 321, 432
N.E.2d 969, 971-72 (1982) (partial damage to automobile caused by defective part not
recoverable under strict liability); Hole v. General Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715, 716-17, 442
N.Y.S.2d 638, 641 (1981) (strict liability relief denied to automobile owner whose car sustained
damage due to frame defect).
" See supra note 124. Generally, courts which accept § 402A do not consider a product
unreasonably dangerous if the product inflicts only economic loss damage upon an item of
the user's property. See generally HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 18, § 4.22 (1974 & Supp.
1980).
2 Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 173 Mont. 345. , 567 P.2d 916, 922 (1977) (strict
liability relief allowed in case involving crop damage); Lockwood Corp. v. Spencer, 613
S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (strict liability relief denied in case involving crop
damage).
Whitaker, 173 Mont. at __ , 567 P.2d at 922.
Spencer, 613 S.W.2d at 370-71.
129 Id.
... See supra text accompanying notes 121-125.
'1 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66 (Purvis court's use of nature of risk
analysis); supra text accompanying notes 90-95 (Purvis court's treatment of Kaiser Steel
test).
13 See supra text accompanying notes 110-113 (Purvis court's application of nature of
the risk analysis).
'" See 674 F.2d at 222-23 (Purvis accepted risk of curing barn ineffectiveness); supra
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entity under the Kaiser Steel test.134 The Purvis court found only two
elements of the Kaiser Steel four-part test significant and utilized these
two elements in formulating the nature of the risk analysis.13
Although the Fourth Circuit's use of the nature of the risk analysis
in Purvis yielded a correct result,13 the nature of the risk analysis could
yield incorrect results in future cases. 3 ' The nature of the risk analysis
is highly subjective and allows courts much discretion in determining
what constitutes a commercial risk. 8' For example, a court might apply
the nature of the risk analysis and determine that a consumer who pur-
chases goods with the slightest degree of pre-sale negotiation accepts a
commercial risk and is ineligible for strict liability relief.3 9 If courts apply
the nature of the risk analysis with such a preference toward finding
commercial risks, courts may create an incentive for consumers to pur-
chase goods blindly without any pre-sale inquiry into product safety.40
The nature of the risk test will be useful to courts only when the courts
have clear guidelines to distinguish commercial risks from consumer
risks.
After the Fourth Circuit's decision in Purvis, Purvis probably can-
not get relief in the federal court system.4 The Fourth Circuit denied
Purvis' petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc" and likely will not
grant Purvis an additional rehearing."4 In addition, South Carolina does
not have a certification statute44 that allows for federal courts sitting in
text accompanying note 119 (Purvis knew that CEPCO barns could diminish the value of his
tobacco).
'" See 674 F.2d at 223; supra text accompanying notes 90-95 (Purvis court's treatment
of Kaiser Steel test).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 105-112 (Purvis court's formulation of nature of
the risk analysis).
11 See 674 F.2d at 223; supra text accompanying notes 90-91, 119-120 (nature of the risk
analysis shows that Purvis accepted commercial risks).
" See 674 F.2d at 222-23. In Purvis, the Fourth Circuit did not explain in detail the
nature of the risk test. Id. Additionally, the Purvis court did not distinguish clearly between
consumer and commercial risks. Id. at 221-23; see also infra text accompanying notes
138-140.
' See 674 F.2d at 223.
' See id. Since the Fourth circuit did not define what kinds of pre-sale negotiations in-
cur commercial risks, the nature of the risk analysis is a nebulous test for determining when
a buyer acts as a commercial entity. Id.
"I See id. If consumers believe that any pre-sale negotiation with a product seller will
exempt them from strict liability protection, consumers may make a conscious effort to
avoid asking any questions pertaining to product safety or reliability in an effort to retain
the option of strict liability relief. See generally Keeton, Assumption of the Risk in Pro-
ducts Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 122 (1961).
"' See 674 F.2d at 217. The Fourth Circuit denied Purvis' motion for rehearing on
April 15, 1982. Id.
142 Id.
" See R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 470-74 (1981) (appellate
courts almost always summarily deny petitions for additional rehearings).
'" 674 F.2d at 219.
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diversity to transfer questions of state law to the South Carolina
Supreme Court."' Purvis, therefore, has no grounds to argue that the
Fourth Circuit misapplied the South Carolina strict liability law until the
South Carolina Supreme Court renders an opinion on the availability of
strict liability protection to commercially transacting parties.
After Purvis, purchasers who accept commercial risks in the Fourth
Circuit will have to find their relief in products liability actions within
the law of express and implied warranty. " ' Courts that apply the Purvis
reasoning will utilize the nature of the risk analysis..7 in determining if a
plaintiff is eligible for strict liability relief."' Generally, courts that
follow Purvis will deny a buyer strict liability relief if the buyer con-
tracts in a commercial setting with a seller and negotiates the risk of
loss from product defects."' Purvis does not, however, determine that
strict liability protection is never available to commercial plaintiffs.150
Commercial parties who rely on products as consumers and do not ac-
cept commercial risks deserve strict liability protection.'
JOHN RANDALL MINCHEW
B. Federal Tort Claims Act: Administrative Claim as a
Prerequisite to Actions Under the Federal Drivers Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act' (the Act) permits recovery against the
United States for tortious conduct committed by government agents
145 Id.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 72-76 (express and implied warranties).
.. See 674 F.2d at 222-23; supra text accompanying notes 61-64, 107-13 (nature of the
risk analysis).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 62, 107-13 (strict liability relief eligibility).
1.9 See 674 F.2d at 220; Kaiser Steel, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845; supra
text accompanying notes 109-22 (Purvis application of Kaiser Steel test).
1" See 674 F.2d at 222; supra note 78 (consumer purchasers).
.5 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78 (commercial purchasers).
1 Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, tit. iv, 60 Stat. 843 (1946) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.). The Federal Tort Claims Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on United
States district courts to hear all claims against the United States for injury caused by any
government employee under circumstances in which a private individual would be liable. 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976. The Act's broad waiver of immunity is subject to a number of
qualifications set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
Beginning in 1923, Congress considered legislation establishing a federal tort claims
act. See McCabe, Observations on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 3 FORUM 66, 68 (1968). In
1928, President Coolidge vetoed a bill which both houses of Congress had passed. Id. In
1939-41, Congress initiated a new effort to pass a tort claims act with the introduction of
twelve tort claims bills, resulting in passage of the present Act in August 1946. Id.; see
generally Symposium on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 FED. B.J. 136 (1964).
2 See L. JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY: HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 1 (1979).
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The Act imposes liability on the United States in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual.' In 1961, Congress enacted
the Federal Drivers Act as an amendment to the Federal Tort Claims
Act.4 The amendment provides that the exclusive civil remedy for tort
claims resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an
Before the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, relief was available against the
government for personal injury or property damage through passage of a private relief bill
in Congress. See generally Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal
Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 321-26 (1942); Note, Private Bills in Congress,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1688-93 (1966).
In the absence of a specific waiver, courts historically applied the common-law doctrine
of sovereign immunity to prohibit suits against government entities, particularly the
federal government. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949)
(no jurisdiction to sue government absent consent); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
151, 154 (1834) (no common-law right to sue United States); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat) 82, 86 (1821) (sovereign state not subject to lawsuit except by own consent). Although
based on the rationale "the King can do no wrong," the doctrine of sovereign immunity sur-
vived the American rejection of the English monarchy in the eighteenth century. 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 254 (1809); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 458-59
(3d ed. 1927). The maxim evolved from the principle that no court superseded the King's
authority. Parker, The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministrations, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 167, 168 (1952). In Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907), Justice Holmes
stated a sovereign is exempt from suit on the grounds that plaintiffs have "no legal right
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Id. at 353. Modern
doctrine is simply that the federal government is immune from suit without its permission.
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 29.2-.3, at 1609-10 (1956).
3 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976); see Big Head v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 510, 512 (D.
Mont. 1958) (United States liable as private person under like circumstances); supra note 1
(discussing Federal Tort Claims Act).
' Pub. L. No. 87-258, 75 Stat. 539 (1961) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b)-2679(e) (1976)).
The effective date of the Federal Drivers Act was March 21, 1962.
In 1960, Congress considered a bill granting personal immunity to government drivers.
S. REP. No. 736, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 16, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2784, 2797. Though Congress passed the measure, President Eisenhower objected to a sec-
tion in the bill which would condition the bill's effect upon the plaintiff's consent to removal
of a state court action to federal court. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2797. The President believed that this provision made the bill ineffective and incon-
sistent since any plaintiff refusing to give his consent could prevent conversion of an action
into one under the Act and therefore thwart the purposes of the original bill. H.R. Doc. No.
415, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REC. 12455 (1960). In the next session, Congress passed
a similar bill without the section requiring plaintiff's consent. 107 CONG. REC. 18499-500
(1961); see McCord, Fault Without Liability; Immunity of Federal Employees, 1966 U. ILL.
L.F. 849, 851-52 (1966).
Prior to enactment of the Federal Drivers Act, Congress considered several proposals
attempting to grant immunity to government drivers. Some of these bills sought to indem-
nify the driver after payment of judgments or claims. See H.R. 4492, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-3 (1955). Additional bills proposed that the government pay for liability insurance for its
employees. See H.R. 10577, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1956). Congress ultimately utilized the
Act to provide relief to government drivers. S. REP. No. 736, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2,
reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2784, 2786; see Comment, Administrative
Claims and the Substitution of the United States as Defendant under the Federal Drivers
Act. The Catch 22 of the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 29 EMORY L.J. 755, 763-64 (1980).
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employee of the federal government acting in the line of duty is an ac-
tion against the United States.5 The Federal Drivers Act also provides
immunity for the negligent government driver," thus precluding an in-
jured individual's option of bringing suit against the driver personally7
or the United States under the principle of respondeat superior.' The
Act sets forth a procedure to dispose of actions brought against a
government driver in his individual capacity.'
In 1966, Congress made substantial changes to the Federal Tort
5 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1976). Subsection (b) provides that under the remedy by suit
against the United States as provided 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976), resulting from the opera-
tion by a government employee of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his
employment is exclusive of any other civil actions. Id.
6Id.
Prior to passage of the Federal Drivers Act, an injured plaintiff could sue the
negligent driver in his personal capacity. See, e.g., United States v. First Sec. Bank, 208
F.2d 424, 428 (10th Cir. 1953) (individual liable for tort injuries caused by negligence); Burks
v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337, 339 (S.D. Tex. 1953) (government employee liable for tort
to third person).
S The Federal Tort Claims Act imposes liability on the federal government on the
basis of conventional respondeat superior principles. See, e.g., Williams v. United States,
350 U.S. 857, 857 (1955) (per curiam) (case controlled by doctrine of respondeat superior);
United States v. Holcombe, 277 F.2d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1960) (policy of Act is to fix govern-
ment liability under respondeat superior). Respondeat superior means that a master is
liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant. Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Govro,
407 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1969). Under the doctrine, the master is responsible for
negligence on the servant's part towards whom those the master owes a duty to use care,
provided failure by the servant to use such care occurred within the course of employment.
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Magnolia Pipe Line Co., 35 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
Prior to the Federal Drivers Act, government employees risked personal liability in the
course of official duty, and employees felt financially compelled to carry their own liability
insurance. Note, The Constitutionality and Basic Fairness of the Government Drivers Law,
54 MINN. L. REv. 645,651-52 (1970). Congress granted government drivers personal immunity
from accidents occurring within the scope of federal employment to alleviate the federal
employees' financial burden. S. REP. No. 736, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1961
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2784, 2789-90.
' See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(c)-2679(e) (1976). The Federal Drivers Act requires the At-
torney General to defend suits brought in any court against federal employee for negligence
while the employee acted within the scope of his employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c) (1976). To
insure that the Attorney General can appear and defend the suit, the Federal Drivers Act
requires government drivers to deliver papers served upon them to the driver's superior
who must furnish copies of the process to the Attorney General. Id. In an action initially
commenced in state court, the party may not join the federal government until removal of
the action to federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). To accomplish removal and
joinder, the Attorney General first must present a certificate issued by the appropriate
agency, admitting that the driver was operating the vehicle within the scope of federal
employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1976). Following removal, but prior to trial on the merits,
any party may move to remand. Id. If the court finds that the government driver was not
acting within the scope of his employment, the court remands the case to state court. Id. In
the alternative, if the court determines that the government driver was acting within the
scope of his employment, the Federal Drivers Act grants the employee personal immunity
and deems the suit a tort action against the federal government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Id.
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Claims Act to provide increased authority to federal agencies to
facilitate administrative settlement of tort claims."0 The purpose of Con-
gress in enacting the 1966 amendments was to reduce the number of
suits filed under the Act"1 and to allow the government agency whose
employee caused the injury to consider and settle the claim. 2 The Act
requires presentation of a written claim to the appropriate federal agency
as a prerequisite to commencement of a civil action against the govern-
ment. 3 Failure by a plaintiff to submit a written claim within two years
after the claim accrues will bar a tort action against the United States.4
The exclusive remedy provided by the Federal Drivers Act combined
with the Act's strict administrative claims procedure may result in a
harsh outcome for plaintiffs who are unaware that a negligent driver
was a federal employee in the line of duty." An injured plaintiff typically
"l Pub. L. No. 89-506, 80 Stat. 306 (1976) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401, 2671-2680 (1976)).
Since the amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act provided for administrative settle-
ment, the procedures set forth in the amendments were not to become effective until the
enactment date in July 1966. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2519. This interim period allowed federal agencies to instruct
employees on the new responsibilities. Id.
" Prior to passage of the 1966 amendments, claimants filed between 1500 and 2000
new tort cases against the government each year. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2518.
" S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2517. See generally Improvements of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Govern-
ment Litigation: Hearing on H.R. 13650 Before the House Subcomm. No. 2 of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 15 (1966).
.3 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976). For purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act the plaintiff
must file an administrative claim with the federal agency whose activities give rise to the
claim. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1) (1981). If the government denies the claim or offers an amount
that is unsatisfactory, a claimant may bring an action in federal district court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(b) (1976). The amount requested, however, may not exceed the amount of the ad-
ministrative claim. Id. § 2675(b). Courts make an exception if newly discovered evidence or a
demonstration of intervening facts relating to the administrative claim justifies an increased
amount. See Morgan v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 794, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (amount
restricted to claim when no newly discoverable evidence).
1 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). Having required the filing of an administrative claim prior
to bringing suit against the government, Congress additionally amended § 2401(b) of Title
28 to include the filing of an administrative claim within two years rather than requiring the
claimant to bring suit. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 8, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2522.
In computing the two-year limitation period, courts exclude the day of the accident and
include the last day of the two-year period. Prince v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 269, 272
(E.D. Wis. 1960). Mailing an administrative claim addressed to the appropriate agency,
however, does not meet the statutory requirement that the plaintiff present the claim to the
appropriate federal agency. See Steele v. United States, 390 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (S.D. Cal.
1975) (mailing not sufficient to toll Act's statute of limitations). The requirement in § 2675(a)
of presentation of a claim is at a minimum the equivalent of a filing. Avril v. United States,
461 F.2d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1972).
" See, e.g., Fuller v. Daniel, 438 F. Supp. 928, 930 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (court notes un-
fairness of result in dismissing plaintiff's action originally commenced in state court without
knowledge driver was federal employee); Montalvo v. Graham, 390 F. Supp. 533, 534 (E.D.
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brings an action against a negligent driver individually, without realiz-
ing the need to file an administrative claim. 6 The defendant raises the
issue of personal immunity and the court substitutes the United States
as proper defendant. 7 The court then dismisses the plaintiffs suit for
failure to present the requisite claim."8 A more serious result occurs
when the negligent driver raises the personal immunity defense after
the tolling of the Act's two-year statute of limitations. 9 In United States
v. Wilkinson,0 the Fourth Circuit considered whether a plaintiffs lack of
awareness that the federal employee driving the automobile was in the
line of duty at the time of the accident excuses the plaintiffs failure to
file an administrative claim within two years.2'
On October 3, 1978 in Norfolk, Virginia, an automobile operated by
Richard Gray struck Tilden Wilkinson.' At the time of the accident,
Gray, a first-class boatswain's mate, was on Naval duty, serving with the
U.S.S. Miller in Boston, Massachusetts." Gray drove from Boston to Nor-
folk in a car leased to the U.S.S. Miller in order to pick up and deliver
parts and mail for the ship.'4 The accident occurred while Gray was
returning to his hotel after delivering the ship's mail." Following the ac-
cident, Wilkinson retained Howard I. Legum as counsel to represent him
in his claim against Gray." Legum obtained a copy of the accident report
which showed that Gray was in the Navy and stationed in Boston.'
Wis. 1975) (claimant's failure to file administrative claim within two years resulted in
dismissal on basis of statute of limitations); Smith v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 1224, 1226
(W.D. Tenn. 1971) (plaintiff does not satisfy requirement of filing administrative claim by
commencing action in state court); Driggers v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1377, 1379
(D.S.C. 1970) (requirement of filing administrative claim is prerequisite to suit under Act).
See generally Comment, supra note 4.
," See, e.g., Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 547 (8th Cir. 1980) (action brought in state
court against federal employee due to plaintiff's lack of knowledge of significance of driver's
employment by government). See generally Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act and
Administrative Claims, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 336 (1968).
"7 See supra text accompanying note 9 (discussing Federal Drivers Act procedures).
8 See Pitard, Procedural Aspects of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 21 Loy. L. REv. 899,
900 n.8 (1975). If the plaintiff files suit before filing the administrative claim, the courts nor-
mally dismiss the action without prejudice, reserving to the plaintiff the right to refile. Id.
19 See supra note 15 (citing decisions dismissing plaintiff's actions).







26 Id. Gray promptly contacted both the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Miller and
the car rental company, informing them of the accident and the circumstances. Id. at 1000.
' Id. at 999. The first interrogatory that Wilkinson's counsel directed to Gray re-
quested him to state his duty station, the name of his ship, and its address. Joint Appendix
at 7, Wilkinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1982). Gray's counsel answered the
interrogatory from Wilkinson's attorney in October 1978. Id. at 999.
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Nevertheless, neither Legum nor Wilkinson discovered that Gray was
acting in the line of Naval duty at the time of the accident.'
Wilkinson filed suit against Gray in state court on September 17,
1980, almost two years after the accident. On October 10, 1980, Gray, by
his insurance counsel, filed a responsive pleading asserting Gray was
within the scope of his Naval duty at the time of the accident." Relying
on the personal immunity grant of the Federal Drivers Act, Gray moved
for dismissal." Wilkinson's attorney subsequently filed an ad-
ministrative claim with the Navy on October 20, 1980, seventeen days
after the statute of limitations expired.2 The claims attorney for the
Navy determined that Gray was within the scope of his government duty
at the time of the accident and requested representation by the United
States Attorney.' The United States Attorney successfully petitioned
the state court for removal of the case to federal district court and
subsequently filed a motion for substitution of the United States as
proper party defendant. 4 The government moved for dismissal based
upon Wilkinson's failure to file an administrative claim prior to bringing
suit against the United States." The district court found that Gray was
operating the rented automobile within the course of his federal employ-
ment.' Following substitution of the United States as defendant, the
677 F.2d at 999. Following the accident, Legum contacted the attorney retained by
the car rental company's insurance carrier. Id. Legum failed to explore the possibility that
the accident occurred while Gray was acting within the scope of his employment. Id.
' Id. Wilkinson served process on the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in accordance
with the Virginia long-arm statute. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-308 & 310 (1980). The certificate
shows that Wilkinson served the Commissioner on September 22, 1980. Joint Appendix at 4,
Wilkinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1982). Gray had twenty-one days to re-
spond. VA. SuP. CT. C.P.R. 3:5.
677 F.2d at 999.
1 Id. at 1000; see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1976). See generally supra notes accompanying
text 5-9 (discussing provisions of Federal Drivers Act).
' 677 F.2d at 1001 n.5; see also supra note 14 (discussing computation of time period
for statute of limitations purposes).
' 677 F.2d at 1003; see supra note 9 (United States Attorney required to defend suit).
The claims attorney for the Navy investigated the circumstances surrounding the accident
for almost four months before determining that Gray was within the scope of federal
employment. 677 F.2d at 1003.
" 677 F.2d at 1001. On April 6, 1981, the United States Attorney removed the action
from state court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia at
Norfolk. Joint Appendix at 29-31, Wilkinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1982).
On April 30, 1981, the United States Attorney filed a motion to substitute the federal
government as the proper defendant and filed a motion to dismiss the action. Joint Ap-
pendix at 32, Wilkinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1982).
677 F.2d at 999.
Wilkinson v. Gray, 523 F. Supp. 372, 374-75 (E.D. Va. 1981). The law of the state in
which the negligent or wrongful conduct occurs determines whether a federal employee's
acts are within the scope of his employment. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 857
(1955) (per curiam); see Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 801 (1972) (respondeat superior deter-
mines government's liability under Act); see also Bissel v. McElligott, 369 F.2d 115, 117 (8th
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district court ruled that the filing of an administrative claim was a pre-
requisite to federal jurisdiction and that the statute of limitations had
expired before Wilkinson filed an administrative claim. 7
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of
the tort claim. The majority agreed with the lower court's finding that
Gray was acting within the scope of his duty at the time his car struck
Wilkinson. 9 In accordance with the Federal Drivers Act, the Fourth Cir-
Cir. 1966) (words "line of duty" in statute invoke state law of respondeat superior to tort
claims arising out of wrongful acts of military personnel); Kimball v. United States, 262 F.
Supp. 509, 511-12 (D.N.J. 1967) (use of term "line of duty" does not expand area of govern-
ment's liability for acts of employees beyond traditional respondeat superior concepts);
Farmer v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 750, 751 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (determination of whether
particular act is within scope of employment is made under applicable law of state where ac-
cident occurred); infra note 39 (discussing Virginia test for determining whether act within
scope of employment).
523 F. Supp. at 376.
677 F.2d at 1002.
Id. at 999-1000. In Wilkinson, the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Miller supplied
Gray with the rented vehicle and directed him to travel to Norfolk. Id. at 999. At the time of
the accident, Wilkinson was returning from delivering the ship's mail with the intention of
eating dinner and going to his hotel room. Id. at 999-1000. The Fourth Circuit correctly
found that eating dinner and staying in a hotel room were entirely incidental to the perform-
ance of Gray's duties for the United States. Id. at 1000. Gray received a daily allowance and
subsistence reimbursement for mileage, food, and lodging. Id. at 999. The Fourth Circuit's
analysis recognizes that Wilkinson's federal employment brought about his journey and
created the exposure to a potential accident. Id. Wilkinson thus acted within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident. Id. The test in Virginia for determining whether an
employee commits the act within the scope of employment is "whether the act was done by
virtue of the employment and in the furtherance of the master's business." Broaddus v.
Standard Drug Co., 211 Va. 645, 652-53, 179 S.E.2d 497, 503-504 (1971). See note 1 supra
(local law determines liability of United States). In Broaddus, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that generally an act is within the scope of employment when the act falls under two
circumstances. Id. at 652-53, 179 S.E.2d at 503-504. First, the servant's act is something fairly
and naturally incident to the business. Id. at 653, 179 S.E.2d at 504. Second, the act occurs
while the servant is doing the master's business with an intent to further the master's in-
terests, and does not arise from some external, independent, or personal motive on the part
of the servant to do an act upon his own account. Id. at 653, 179 S.E.2d at 503-504.
Courts recognize that when employment involves an overnight trip, employees are act-
ing within the scope of employment while proceeding to lodging away from home. Johnston
v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Ga. 1970). In Johnston, a national guard officer on
active training duty caused an accident while proceeding from work to a public restaurant.
Id. at 2. The court found that the officer's daily food and housing allowance from the govern-
ment indicated the officer was in a duty status at the time of the accident. Id. at 4. Noting
the government furnished the officer with the vehicle, the court reasoned that the govern-
ment voluntarily gave' the officer discretion to eat where he chose. Id. In finding the
officer's actions within the scope of government employment, the court concluded that the
government maintained authority to control the officer's movements to a greater extent if
the government so desired. Id. at 4-5.
In Wilkinson, plaintiff's counsel urged the Fourth Circuit to follow Strohkorb v. United
States, 268 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff'd, 393 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam). Brief
for Appellant at 10-11, Wilkinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1982). In
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cuit ruled that Wilkinson's exclusive tort remedy was an action against
the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act." The Fourth
Circuit also found that the administrative procedures of the Act were
applicable to a suit brought pursuant to the Federal Drivers Act.4' The
majority upheld the district court's finding that the filing of a written
claim within two years was a prerequisite to jurisdiction against the
United States under the Act.4'
The Fourth Circuit also dismissed the assertion that the government
intentionally waited until the statute of limitations expired to raise the
Strohkorb, the court found that a serviceman returning to the naval base after eating his
evening meal at home, although officer of the day, was not within the scope of his employ-
ment at the time of an automobile accident about five miles from the base. 268 F. Supp. at
527-28. Significantly, however, the officer in Strohkorb went home to eat for his own con-
venience. Id. at 528. The Fourth Circuit's refusal in Wilkinson to follow Strohkorb correctly
recognizes that Wilkinson was acting within the scope of government employment in pro-
ceeding to overnight lodging authorized by his superior. 677 F.2d at 1000. See generally
Note, Federal Tort Claims Act. Scope of Employment: Liability for Servicemen in Transit
Between Duty Stations-A Quagmire Revisited, 26 JAG. J. 107 (1971).
40 677 F.2d at 999; see supra text accompanying notes 5-8 (Federal Drivers Act grants
personal immunity to government driver).
4, 677 F.2d at 1000; see Meeker v. United States, 435 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (8th Cir. 1970)
(requirement of filing administrative claim cannot be circumvented by filing action in state
court against government employee); Driggers v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1377, 1378-79
(D.S.C. 1970) (plaintiffs letter to government employee with copy to facility where govern-
ment driver worked did not satisfy administrative claim requirement).
12 677 F.2d at 1000 (citing Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 547 (8th Cir. 1980)), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1982)). The Fourth Circuit relied on Wollman for the proposition that
failure to file an administrative claim prior to bringing suit against the United States re-
quires dismissal. 677 F.2d at 1000. In Wollman, the plaintiff's injury arose out of an
automobile accident in June 1976. 637 F.2d at 546. Gross, a federal employee with the
Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Service, worked out of his office and often used
his personal car for business purposes. Id. The accident occurred as Gross returned home
from an assignment. Id. Gross and Wollman were neighbors and neither realized that Gross
was within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Id. Gross did not report
the accident to his office, and his personal insurance company began dealing with the plain-
tiff. Id. In January 1979, more than two years after the accident, Wolman filed suit in state
court. Id In February 1979, the United States replaced Gross as proper party defendant
and removed the case to federal court. Id. In March 1979, the United States filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the plaintiffs failure to file an administrative claim. Id.
Gross then sent an administrative claim to the United States Department of Agriculture
dated July 16, 1979 and filed a motion to remand to state court. Id. The Eighth Circuit noted
the harshness of the result, but strictly applied the administrative claims requirement in
dismissing the action. Id. at 549-50; see also Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344, 347 (9th
Cir. 1981) (court dismissed case in which attorney mailed claim within two-year limitations
period but claim never received by government agency); Dunaville v. Carnago, 485 F. Supp.
545, 548-49 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (suit dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to file administrative
claim within time period even though plaintiff unaware of federal employee status of
driver); Malicote v. McDowell, 479 F. Supp. 63, 64 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (action commenced in
state court dismissed for failure to file administrative claim); Montalvo v. Graham, 390 F.
Supp. 533, 534 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (claimant's failure to file administrative claim within two
years resulted in dismissal on basis of statute of limitations).
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
scope of employment issue.43 The court noted that Wilkinson's attorney
negotiated exclusively with Gray's insurance counsel during the in-
tervening two years following the accident. 4' Gray's insurance counsel
represented him in all aspects of the state court proceedings and filed
the original motion to dismiss.45 The court noted that the United States
Attorney's first contact with the case occurred with the filing of the
government's petition for removal on April 6, 1981.46 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the government counsel had no knowledge of any of the
prior proceedings until after the two-year limitation period expired.
4 7
The majority also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the terms of
the Federal Tort Claims Act do not require expressly the filing of an ad-
ministrative claim within two years of the date of injury. 8 The dissent in
Wilkinson contended that Congress only required the filing of a claim
within two years after the date of accrual of the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion.49 To determine the date of accrual under the Federal Drivers Act,
the dissent urged the majority to adopt the rule announced by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kubrick.5 The Kubrick Court held
677 F.2d at 1000 (citing Kelly v. United States, 568 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978)). In Kelly, the plaintiff brought the action in state court within
the two-year limitation period. 563 F.2d at 260-61. After the statute of limitations expired,
the government removed the case to district court and moved for dismissal on the basis of
failure to file an administrative claim. Id. at 261. The district court denied the government's
motion, ruling that the government lulled the plaintiff into a false sense of security. Id. at
262. The district court reasoned that the government waited until the limitations period ran
before moving for substitution of the United States as proper party defendant. Id. On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit affirmed on substantially different grounds. Id. at 268-69; see infra
notes 62-64 (discussing modification of lower court's ruling by Second Circuit).
" 677 F.2d at 1000.
'" Id. The motion to dismiss in the state court was filed on October 10, 1980. Id.
" Id. at 1001.
'" Id. The Fourth Circuit in Wilkinson correctly ruled that the government did not
wait intentionally until the Act's two-year statute of limitations period ended before assert-
ing the scope of employment defense. Id. at 1000. The Fourth Circuit's holding recognizes
that the government counsel had no contact with the case until after the limitations period
expired. Id. Following the filing of the petition for removal, the government filed a motion
for substitution of the United States as proper defendant and a motion for dismissal on
April 30, 1981. Id. at 1001.
677 F.2d at 1001.
"9 Id. at 1001-1002; see 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). The Fourth Circuit majority noted
that Wilkinson failed to raise the issue of delayed accrual in either his brief or in oral
arguments. Id. at 1002. Despite this ruling, the majority addressed the issue in response to
the dissent's argument. Id.
677 F.2d at 1003 (discussing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1978)). In
Kubrick, the government doctors treated the plaintiff with neomycin at a Veteran's Ad-
ministration hospital for an infection of the right femur. 444 U.S. at 113-14. Irrigation of the
infected area with neomycin led to a ringing sensation in the plaintiff's ears and loss of hear-
ing six weeks later. Id. An ear specialist, who had secured Kubrick's records from the
Veteran's Administration, advised Kubrick that the neomycin treatment might be responsi-
ble for the hearing loss. Id. at 114. The plaintiff did not file a claim against the government
until later when another physician advised him that neomycin was the cause of the injury.
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that in a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiffs cause of action accrues
at the time the plaintiff discovers the critical facts concerning the ex-
istence and the cause of the injury rather than on the date of the actual
injury. 1 Applying the Kubrick analysis to the facts in Wilkinson, the dis-
sent argued that an essential element of an action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act is the plaintiff's knowledge that a federal employee act-
ing within the scope of his employment caused the injury.2 The dissent
criticized the majority's holding that the claim accrued at the time of the
accident as contrary to the language of the statute and inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's opinion in Kubrick.1
The Fourth Circuit in Wilkinson held that the Kubrick reasoning did
not apply to a claim brought under the Federal Drivers Act.' The court
noted that in a malpractice case, the plaintiff's injury often does not
manifest itself until after the date of the injury.5 The Fourth Circuit
Id. at 114-15. The Court held that Kubrick's cause of action accrued when the plaintiff learned
of the possibility that the neomycin caused his injury, not when he learned that the doctor
causing the injury was legally responsible. Id. at 122. The Court, however, reversed an addi-
tional extension of the rule by the Third Circuit, and held that accrual cannot be deferred.
until a plaintiff learns of a defendant's negligence or legal fault. Id. at 121-22. In reaching its
decision in Kubrick, the Supreme Court held that federal law establishes when a claim ac-
crues. Id. at 117. The Court explained that the Act's statute of limitations provisions was a
condition of the waiver of the United States sovereign immunity and courts should not ex-
tend the time period beyond the scope of congressional intent. Id. at 118.
"I 677 F.2d at 1002. The Kubrick Court found that the cause of action accrues at the
time the plaintiff knows that he has been hurt and knows who inflicted the injury. 444 U.S.
at 122. The doctrine announced by the Court in Kubrick originated from the rule of
"blameless ignorance." Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). In Urie, the Supreme Court
held that a cause of action accrues under the Federal Employer's Liability Act after notice of
invasion of the plaintiffs legal rights. Id. at 170. The Court reasoned that Congress did not
intend for the statute of limitations to bar an action when blameless ignorance prevented
discovery of the injury and its cause. Id. In 1962, the Fifth Circuit, borrowing the blameless
ignorance notion from Urie, adopted a similar rule for medical malpractice suits brought
against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Quinton v. United States, 304
F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1962). In Quinton, the court held that a claim accrues when the claimant
discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover the acts constituting the
alleged malpractice. Id. at 240.
677 F.2d at 1002.
Id. In Wilkinson, the dissent noted that the Kubrick Court accepted the govern-
ment's construction of § 2401(b) that a malpractice claim does not accrue until the plaintiff
knows both the existence and the cause of his injury. Id. at 1004. The Wilkinson dissent
argued that although Wilkinson knew of the existence of the injury on the night he was in
the accident, he did not know that Gray was acting within the scope of federal government
employment until later. Id. at 1003. The dissent argued that Wilkinson's claim accrued
within the meaning of § 2401(b) when Wilkinson or his attorney knew or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known that a governmental employee acting within the
scope of his employment caused Wilkinson's injury. Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1002.
Id. The general rule of tort law is that a claim accrues at the time of the plaintiffs in-
jury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899, comment c at 441 (1977). To alleviate the harsh
result in medical malpractice claims, however, courts have modified the general rule to
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stated that delaying the accrual date until the plaintiff discovers the ex-
istence and the cause of the injury is proper in a medical malpractice
context." In an automobile injury suit, however, the Wilkinson majority
reasoned that knowledge of an injury and the identity of the person
causing the injury are immediately apparent. 7 The court explained that
Wilkinson was aware of sufficient facts to put him on notice that Gray
was operating the vehicle within the course of government
employment. 8 The court noted that Gray's responsibility for the plain-
tiff's injury was immediately apparent. 9 The Fourth Circuit found that
Wilkinson was merely unaware that the Federal Driver's Act limited
Wilkinson's remedy solely to recovery against the United States."
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Wilkinson stands in direct conflict
with the Second Circuit's decision in Kelly v. United States." In Kelly,
the Second Circuit held that the filing of an administrative claim is not a
prerequisite to suit following substitution of the United States as the
proper defendant pursuant to the Federal Drivers Act.2 The Kelly court
found that the 1966 amendment to the Act did not apply to actions
brought in state courts against negligent drivers acting within the scope
delay accrual of the claim until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should discover, both the injury and its cause. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Gotlieb & Young, Medical Malpractice and
Limitations Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 13 DEF. L.J. 257 (1964); Sacks, Statutes of
Limitations and Undiscovered Malpractice, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 65 (1967).
' 677 F.2d at 1002; see supra text accompanying notes 50-51 (discussing Kubrick).
17 677 F.2d at 1002.
5 Id.
59 Id.
'0 Id. The Wilkinson court found that Wilkinson merely was unaware that the Federal
Drivers Act granted Gray personal immunity. Id.; see also Miller v. United States, 418 F.
Supp. 373, 377 (D. Minn. 1976) (claim against federal government not dependent upon admis-
sion that employee defendant acted within scope of federal employment).
1 Kelly v. United States, 568 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978). In
Kelly, an automobile driven by an employee of the Department of Agriculture struck the
plaintiff in November 1972. Id. at 260-61. In May 1973, plaintiff brought suit in state court,
unaware that the accident occurred within the scope of the defendant's federal employment.
Id. at 261. The government removed the case to district court in February 1975, after the
two-year limitation period expired. Id. In May 1975, the government moved for substitution
of the United States as proper defendant and to have the action dismissed, based upon the
plaintiff's failure to file the requisite administrative claim. Id. at 261.
" Id. at 268. In Wilkinson, the majority addressed the Kelly decision, but misapplied
the Kelly rationale in distinguishing its holding. 677 F.2d at 1000. The Fourth Circuit cited
Kelly for the proposition that the government may not lull a plaintiff into a false sense of
security and then raise the scope of employment defense following expiration of the statute
of limitations. Id. In Kelly, the district court held that the government's conduct justified
dispensing with the administrative claim requirement. 568 F.2d at 262 (discussing district
court's unpublished opinion). The Second Circuit, however, significantly modified the lower
court's analysis on appeal. Id. The Second Circuit found that the filing of an administrative
claim is not a prerequisite to suit following substitution of the United States as proper party
defendant pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 268-69.
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of federal employment.' The court found significant the absence of an
explicit reference in the legislative history to suits commenced in state
court and subsequently removed to federal court by the Attorney
General's certificates." The Kelly court also noted that the amendment
only requires the filing of an administrative claim before instituting an ac-
tion against the United States. 5 Relying on this reasoning, the Second
Circuit held that the administrative claims requirement does not apply
to actions commenced in state court and subsequently removed to
federal court under the Federal Drivers Act."
The Second Circuit's rationale in Kelly provides an alternative ap-
proach to the harsh result of the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Wilkinson.7
The Kelly decision, however, is the only decision holding that the filing
of an administrative claim is not a prerequisite to suit following substitu-
tion of the United States as the proper defendant pursuant to the
Federal Drivers Act.' Significantly, in promulgating the 1966 amend-
Id. at 264. In Kelly, the Second Circuit argued that Congress enacted the 1966
amendments to the Act to relieve the great volume of tort cases to allow for the settlement
of claims against the United States without the necessity of filing suit. See supra text ac-
companying notes 10-14 (discussing 1966 Amendments to Federal Tort Claims Act).
" 568 F.2d at 264. The Kelly court reasoned that § 2679(b)-(e) implied that an action
against a federal employee constitutes an action against the United States. Id. The Second
Circuit in Kelly therefore concluded the statute does not mandate dismissal once the court
substitutes the United States as proper defendant and removes the action to federal district
court. Id.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976) (plaintiff shall not institute action against United
States unless plaintiff first presents administrative claim).
' 568 F.2d at 266-67; see Harris v. Burris Chem., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
In Harris, plaintiff brought suit in state court against a federal employee driver. Id. The
government moved for removal and substitution of the United States as defendant. Id. In
rejecting the government's motion to dismiss, the Harris court held that when the plaintiff,
prior to filing suit, knows or had reason to know that the other driver was a federal
employee acting within the scope of his employment, the administrative claims requirement
applies. Id. at 971. However, when the plaintiff brings suit in state court because the plain-
tiff did not know and bad no reason to know that the defendant was a federal employee act-
ing within the scope of his employment, no administrative claim is necessary. Id. at 971; see
also United States v. LaPatourel, 571 F.2d 405, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1978) (cause of action did not
accrue until court's declaration that federal judges were federal employees under Act);
Henderson v. United States, 429 F.2d 588, 590 n.2 (10th Cir. 1970) (timely action commenced
in state court tolls Federal Tort Claims Act statute of limitations).
677 F.2d at 1001.
' 568 F.2d at 264. Before Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1966 to
require the filing of an administrative claim as a prerequisite to suit, courts narrowly con-
strued provisions of the Federal Drivers Act as an exclusive remedy against the United
States. Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act: Interpretation of Two Year Period of Limita-
tions, 34 TENN. L. REV. 421, 422-23 (1967). Courts strictly applied the federal statute of
limitations to bar suits commenced originally in state court, notwithstanding the fact that
the suit was timely under the applicable state statute of limitations. See, e.g., Whealton v.
United States, 271 F. Supp. 770, 771-72 (E.D. Va. 1967); Hock v. Carter, 242 F. Supp. 863, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
In Whealton, the court considered a suit for property damages timely brought under
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ments implementing the administrative claims procedure, Congress also
provided that in the case of third-party complaints, cross-claims, or
counterclaims, the presentation and denial of an administrative claim is
not a prerequisite to suit. 9 Failure to provide the same exception for
cases removed from state court under the Federal Drivers Act supports
the presumption that Congress specifically chose not to make such an ex-
ception." The Second Circuit's decision in Kelly effectively engrafts an
additional exception under the Act to the administrative claims pro-
cedure.1 In contrast, other courts consistently have held that the ex-
haustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to suit following
substitution of the United States as defendant pursuant to the Federal
Drivers Act.7"
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Wilkinson represents the soundest
approach given the administrative claim requirement of the Federal
Tort Claims Act.73 The Kelly decision's broad language applies to all
cases brought initially in state court against an individual and subse-
quently removed to federal court, followed by substitution of the United
the Virginia five-year statute of limitations. 271 F. Supp. at 771. Upon removal, the district
court dismissed the case for failure to bring the action within the two years allowed by the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 773-74.
In Hoch, plaintiff commenced a timely suit in the state court individually against the
driver of a United States mail truck. 242 F. Supp. at 865. Suit was not brought within the
two-year statute of limitations of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. Following removal of the
action from state court, the district court dismissed the suit. Id. at 866.
Similarly, in Kizer v. Sherwood, 311 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1970), plaintiff brought suit
against an individual mail carrier in state court. Id. at 810. Following a default judgment but
prior to the award of damages, the government obtained removal. Id. at 810-11. After
substitution of the United States as proper party defendant, the court granted dismissal on
the grounds that the plaintiff failed to bring suit with the two-year limitations period. Id. at
811-12.
6 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976).
Id. In reaching its decision, the Kelly court disregarded the maxim of statutory in-
terpretation which states that the mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of
another. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Franklin County, 387 Ill. 301, 313, 56 N.E.2d 775, 781 (1944).
The rule is one of statutory construction, not of substantive law. Id. Courts apply the maxim
as an aid in discovering the legislative intent when the intent is not otherwise apparent. See
United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1912); see also Comment, supra note 4, at 786.
Implicit in the application of the Kelly court's analysis is the court's recognition that
when Congress grants a waiver of sovereign immunity, Congress may define the conditions
of such a waiver. See supra note 2 (discussion of sovereign immunity); see also United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (United States may not be sued without its
specific consent); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 387 (1939) (courts must strictly
construe Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity).
" See Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (waiver of administrative
claims requirement would rewrite statute of limitations).
" See Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff does not meet
administrative claim requirement by commencing action in state court); Montalvo v.
Graham, 390 F. Supp. 533, 534 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (plaintiff's action dismissed for failure to file
claim within two years).




States as proper party defendant.74 Such a rule permits a plaintiff who is
aware of the defendant's federal employment to avoid filing an ad-
ministrative claim by first bringing suit in state court.75 The Kelly decis-
ion fails to give full effect to Congress' stated purpose of increasing the
administrative adjustment of claims.76 The Fourth Circuit's approach in
Wilkinson is consistent with the language of the Act and the express
congressional intent."
The Fourth Circuit's narrow resolution of the issue in Wilkinson is
significant because the court refused to apply the Kubrick rationale to
claims brought under the Federal Drivers Act. 8 Inherent in the Kubrick
decision is the Supreme Court's recognition that a plaintiff's knowledge
of the injury and the injury's cause is not always apparent in an action
resulting from medical negligence.79 To extend the Kubrick rationale to
the facts in Wilkinson, however, as the Wilkinson dissent suggests,
would delay the running of the statute of limitations until the govern-
ment conceded that an employee acted within the line of duty.,, The
Wilkinson decision demonstrates the Fourth Circuit's realization that
the Kubrick rule is inappropriate in an automobile injury suit." In the
568 F.2d at 264.
7 See supra note 9 (discussing removal of suit originally brought in state court to
district court).
76 H.R. No. 1532, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2515, 2518. The congressional goal in enacting the 1966 amendments of relieving the federal
courts from the voluminous number of suits filed against the government suggests that in-
itially an administrative agency should consider every case unless an exception is provided.
Id. at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2518.
" 677 F.2d at 1002. The Wilkinson court's finding also supports the principle behind
statutes of limitations. See supra notes accompanying text 10-14 (discussing 1966 amend-
ments to Federal Tort Claims Act). Statutes of limitations embody sound public policy by
requiring parties to settle their business matters within reasonable periods. H. WOOD,
LIMITATIONS OF ACTION 8 (4th ed. 1916). Statutes of limitations provisions promote the peace
and welfare of society by not allowing affairs to remain uncertain. H. BUSWELL, STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION 7 (1889). The primary argument in favor of statutes of
limitations is that of fairness to the defendant. Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950). Statutes of limitations are characteristically
statutes of repose based upon the proposition that persons who fail to exercise their rights
may lose the right after a specified period of time. Id. Statutes of limitations also promote
justice by preventing surprise through the revival of claims delayed until evidence is lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. Id.
7' 677 F.2d at 1001.
See supra notes accompanying text 50-51 (discussing Kubrick).
See Katzner v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 1088, 1090 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (rejecting
argument that claim accrues when claim is filed administratively rather than when accident
took place); see also supra note 50 (Kubick court rejected argument that claim accrues
when plaintiff learns of defendants legal fault).
"x 677 F.2d at 1002. Courts consistently have held that the statute of limitations ac-
crues for personal injury from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by a government
employee at the time of the accident. See, e.g., Ianni v. United States, 457 F.2d 804, 805 (6th
Cir. 1972) (claim arose at time mail truck struck plaintiff); Bialowas v. United States, 443
F.2d 1047, 1049 (3d Cir. 1971) (claim arose at time of accident); United States v. Westfall, 197
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case of an automobile accident, the cause of the accident and identity of a
negligent driver usually are immediately known.82 The Act's limitation
period reflects Congress' determination that two years is adequate time
for plaintiffs to discover whether the negligent driver was a federal
employee within the scope of employment."
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the harsh result worked upon the
plaintiff by the Wilkinson decision." The court's ruling effectively
eliminated any possibility of recovery for Wilkinson on his tort claim
against the United States.85 The Fourth Circuit recognized, however,
that acceptance of the alternative arguments in essence would rewrite
the two-year statute of limitations. 6 The Wilkinson court correctly con-
cluded that any change in the law is the prerogative of the Congress and
not within the authority of the courts. 7
The Fourth Circuit in Wilkinson avoided circumventing the
statutory administrative claims requirement but consequently barred a
tort victim's potentially meritorious claim." The court followed the
weight of authority, which strictly applies the administrative claim pro-
cedure to actions brought under the Federal Drivers Act." The Wilkin-
son decision points to the necessity of plaintiff's lawyers determining
whether a negligent driver employed by the government was acting
within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident."
BENTON J. MATHIS, JR.
F.2d 765, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1952) (injury giving rise to action occurred at time of accident); see
supra note 55 (claims generally accrue at time of injury).
677 F.2d at 1002.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
677 F.2d at 1001.
85 Id.
Id. at 1001 n.7.
, Id. at 1001. Courts consistently recognize that the judiciary cannot extend the
statute of limitations period provided by the Congress. See, e.g., Wollman v. Gross, 637
F.2d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (any change in law is prerogative of Congress and not courts);
Miller v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 373, 378 (D. Minn. 1976) (courts have no power to ex-
tend statutory period). See generally Smith, Urging Judicial Restraint, 68 A.B.A.J. 59
(January, 1982).
" See generally supra text accompanying notes 39 to 42.
', See generally supra text accompanying notes 68 to 72.
0 See generally supra text accompanying notes 15 to 19.
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